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It can hardly be disputed that social wel-being issues, including
the mitigation of social and spatial inequalities are one of the
timeliest tasks to be solved for the people of Europe today. This
task is now becoming more important even for America, whose
citizens for a long time, not only much more accepted social
inequalities than the European people, but the atitude towards
them was one of the main indicators and a key factor of the dif-
ference between the US and the European social model. Accor -
ding to a book published in 2008 Americans and Europeans think
about poverty, inequalities, the redistribution of income between
the rich and the poor, social protection and welfare in a different
way. Americans are more or less on the general opinion that the
poor should help themselves. In contrast, Europeans believe it is
primarily the job of the government to lift people out of poverty’
(Alesina–Giavazzi, 2008, 27.).Alesina and Giavazzi, the two
authors of the book, think Europe’s whole future depends on
how it can get rid of today’s social atitude, how it wil reduce its
wel-being activities and how it wil be able to catch up with the
American model.
There are lots of people, who disagree with this, and they come
not only from European societies and their (mostly left-winged)
7The publication was co-financed by the EU and the European Social Fund. It
was prepared in the framework of TÁMOP-4.2.2.A-11/1/KONV-2012-0069
project titled: ‘Social Conflicts – Social Wel-Being and Security – Competitive -
ness and Social Development’. 
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politicians, but also from the representatives of various sciences.
In the field of European science more and more people just pro-
claim that Europe’s ‘Americanization’ is not a solution, the
American model should not be adopted and it is necessary to
preserve those advantageous features of the European system
that are connected to its social base, even if they are different
from the American one (Kazepov, 2010).
But even the opinion of the US political and academic sphere is
subject to change. Barack Obama, the US president in his speech
held at the Center for American Progress Research Institute in
2013 highlighted the risks of the increasing wealth inequalities and
caled for their mitigation8. Joseph E. Stiglitz in his work published
in 2012 under the title ‘The Price of Inequality: How Today’s
Divided Society Endangers Our Future’ reveals the negative eco-
nomic consequences of social and economic inequalities, and at
the same time he points out that ‘excessive inequality is detrimen-
tal to productivity and slows down growth’ (Stiglitz, 2012).
The Nobel Prize-winning American economist strongly criticizes
the current US inequality system based on income and other eco-
nomic factors where 1% of Americans control 40% of national
wealth and also that the top 1% enjoys the best health care, the
best education and the benefits of their property, while the other
99% are excluded from them (Stiglitz, 2012).He also states that
converting economic power into political power is the major
cause of inequality, i.e. the whole contemporary political system
of the US governs for the benefit of the 1% (Stiglitz, 2012).
The introductory chapter is aimed at neither analysing the
European and American social models and their associated social
inequality issues nor providing an alternative of the two models,
and elaborating proposals in this regard. The task undertaken
here is only to indicate social wel-being problems, especialy
those related to the lack of it, which have already reached global
level, and to provide a detailed analysis of some of them but only
in the contemporary Western, Central and Eastern European and
Hungarian context. By the presentation of the different types of
social wel-being issues, social and spatial inequalities we want to
convey the main objective of our book: caling for the need to
8htp://hvg.hu/vilag/20131204_Obama_ot_pontot_vazolt_a_tarsadalmi_egyen/
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intensify the research of European and national social wel-being
systems. We do this, among other things, to point out, that miti -
gating social injustices, handling social inequalities, increasing
social wel-being should be actual objectives of European culture.
Maybe the realization of these goals – especialy in a competition
interpreted only in strict economic terms – does not provide bene-
fits in the race with the American society. To achieve these goals
a very high amount of resources is needed, because these targets
are particularly expensive. In fact, in the short term it is not even
sure that they wil serve for the efficiency of the economy, but they
surely wil strengthen the joy, satisfaction, and social-driven com-
petitiveness of people living in European societies. And they wil –
certainly in the long run – ensure the more dynamic development
of the economy as wel.
Social wel-being issues in Western Europe
In Western Europe there have been obvious signs of the eco-
nomic decline and its adverse social consequences since the
1980s. The oil crisis in l972, the subsequent indebtedness process
and the financial crises in the 1980s in the 1990s and in 2008, the
changes and the turbulence in the level of GDP per capita have put
an end to the period based on optimistic, unbroken economic
development opportunities, which characterised the 1960s.
The basic welfare objectives of individual nation states were
gradualy built down, the eradication of poverty, the provision of
ful employment and supply for al became ideas impossible to
carry out in more and more countries. The retreat of welfare
goals brought about hundreds of social problems. Among them
it is especialy important to mention long-term unemployment
which hit the European states in varying degrees, showing strong-
ly fluctuating index values in different periods (for example,
between 2000 and 2014), and then growing figures after the
2008 economic crisis9.
21
9Changes in the unemployment rate in the EU: 9.2%, in 2000, 6.8% in 2008, 9.2%
in 2010, 10.95% in 2013 and 10.1 % in 2014 (www.geoindex.hu/munkanelkuliseg).
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The increase of poverty10, including urban poverty11also poses
serious difficulties for European countries, although Figure 1., for
example, suggests that the differences in poverty risk among
European households are large. In particular, differences between
Western and Eastern European countries are striking even in
comparison with the EU average.
Urban poverty is difficult to estimate, not only because the very
poor live mostly in disadvantaged areas, smal towns and vilages
but also because urban poverty is less visible. This kind of pover-
ty is multi-factorial (mainly in non-European countries), the poor
living in cities are highly vulnerable, the official institutions often
do not even know how many of them there are, where, which
slums they live in. According to the United Nations’ Centre for
Human Setlements, today one out of six people lives in large
urban slums or in arbitrarily occupied properties12.
Figure 1: Income inequalities in the European Union (2010)
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross sectional EU-SILC, 2011 UDB August 2013
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10In 2010, nearly 81 milion EU citizens lived in income poverty, about 40 mil-
lion people were poor from a financial point of view. 38 milion people lived
in households where the adults worked much less than they could. (Source:
Eurostat, online data series: tsdsc100, tsdsc270, tscsc280, tsdsc310,
tsdsc350, ilc_pees01). In the EU income poverty is the dominant form of
poverty, which in 2012, affected 17.1% of the Union’s total population.
(Summary: Sustainable Development in the European Union, Eurostat,
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/./HU/237HU-HU.PDF)
11In 2011 the proportion of urban poverty in the EU countries was 27.23%.
12Sheridan Barthelt: Children of Urban Poverty (http://www.csagyi.hu/jo-
gyakorlatok/nemzetkozi/item/288-a-nagyvarosi-szegenyseg-gyermekei)
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The spatial social migration – the inflow of mostly unskiled
guest workers, migrants moving from Asian and African countries
into developed European countries in massive scale – not only
increases the number of the urban poor, but also brings in new
panels of social deprivation, and the threats of social conflicts13.
As a result of the reduction of the previous goals of the welfare
state, the reduced amount of the state’s (or even the European
Union’s) resources to redistribute, the fears of public and non-
government employees, operators of losing their jobs or their
market, the contradictory effects of the global economy, the
polarization consequences of global urbanization, the strongly
growing discontent of civil societies, protests, strikes and often a
multitude of brutal street conflicts swept throughout Europe. In
almost al regions of the world, not only in Europe anti-globa -
lization social movements are becoming more and more common
as wel. The social and economic injustices of globalization, the
new movements protesting against environmental hazards, the
various anti-globalization, anti-capitalist and globalization criti-
cising groups are gaining new force.
The social and spatial inequalities in Western Europe
Not everyone accepts that globalization is one of the most fun-
damental components of reducing poverty in the developing
world; therefore the problem is not globalization itself, but other
structural barriers to the spread of globalization and power factors
(Munck, 2005). Many people criticize the aggressive, and also the
homogenizing efects of the lifestyles, cultures and social con-
sumption paterns mediated by globalization as wel as caling
atention to the increasing risks of the decline of national and local
cultures. These opinions are increasingly less wiling to accept that
global capital wants to control not only the economy, but also the
states and social life (Hay–Marsh, 2000; Wilkinson, 2002).
It is more and more obvious that the transformation of the
world economy, the growing intensity of the world-wide econom-
13In 2010, approximately 3.1 milion immigrants came into the EU member
states, while at least two milion emigrants left the member states of the
European Union. According to the most recent data available migration
slightly increased in 2010 compared with 2009. (epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics_explained/../ Migration..migrant../hu)
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ic, social and cultural relations, the processes of globalization
have controversial social consequences. Globalization, the effects
of global capital movements al over the world, and even in
Europe transform the social and power structure, new spatial
and social relations are formed. The setlements previously hold-
ing power have got into a disadvantaged situation, while others
came forward, new metropolitan powers have emerged, often
leaving their national governments behind and creating suprana-
tional decision-making systems.
The territorial demands of global economy polarize the regional
social structure in a specific way. New types of spatial dependen-
cies, social inequalities are formed between regions favoured by
global economy and regions that do not receive global capital, or
regions which, are left behind by transnational multinational com-
panies setling down somewhere else due to global-level decisions.
Although the needs of global capital in the beneficiary regions
provide jobs and even global work culture, in the case of regio -
nal and local level, they generate income and other types of
inequality, while in the case of abandoned areas, they bring
about unemployment. According to what was said at the meet-
ing of the leading top executives of the largest transnational
companies in 1995 “in the coming century, twenty per cent of
the working population wil be enough to keep global economy
at the present dynamism” (Martin–Schumann, 1998).Some pro-
fessional assessments on the future development of world econ-
omy expect rising unemployment and increasing poverty as a
consequence.
There is a great number of scientific works drawing atention to
the dangers of social inequalities induced partly by global econo-
my; while others give a ful and sharp criticism of global process-
es based on capitalist systems as wel. Among them the book ‘Le
nouvel esprit du capitalisme’ (‘The New Spirit of Capitalism’) by Luc
Boltanski and Éva Chiapelo published in 1999 is outstanding;
here the authors present the historical development of capitalism,
its transformation broken down into diferent periods and social
inequality-generating effects with strong criticism (Boltanski–
Chiapelo, 1999).Here it is worth mentioning again Stiglitz’ book
‘The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Threatens Our
Future’ published in 2012, and the book ‘The Capital in the 21st
Century’ writen by French economist Thomas Pikety, published
25
14Pikety, T. (2013): Le Capital au XXIe sičcle. Seuil, Paris 
Pikety, T. (2014): Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA
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in French language14in 2013 and in English language in 2014. In
the later book, which received significant international aten-
tion, the French economist not only criticizes, but even claims
that today’s income, property and increasingly severe economic
inequalities already threaten the future of the entire capitalism
(Pikety, 2014).
The worldwide facts clearly show the concentration of wealth.
According to the data 0.5% of the world’s population owns more
than a third of the global wealth (net worth) (Credit Suise, 2010,
inequality.org).Another data indicates that 1% of the richest owns
nearly half of the world’s total assets (htp: //www.nbr.co.nz/sites/
default/files/credit-suise-global-wealth-report-2014.pdf). It is evident from
the works of Saskia Sassen, the American sociologist and of others
that big cities and metropolitan regions play a major role in the
development and organization of world economy. They are strate-
gic locations, because they are the centres of innovation, production
and services(Hal, 1996; Sasen, 1991, 2000, 2007, 476.).The dyna mic
operation of the post-Fordist economy, the growth of the service
industry is mostly ensured by big metropolises. These growth poles
command economic development. They are the places where inter-
national capital appears, where international skiled labour emerges
as wel as the places of the development of information technology,
of the organization of relations between nations and of social and
cultural diversity. It is the metropolitan regions that ofer competi-
tive advantages for global companies as wel.
Behind the key social and economic roles of metropolitan
regions we can find powerful economic and social processes of
centralization which can be observed in the developed countries
of Western Europe (and even in the United States and Japan).
Starting from the 1960s and 1970s the concentration of the ser -
vice sector and skiled labour in metropolitan regions, the rise of
multiregional and interregional, later multinational, transnational
corporations and the consequent strong development of big
cities and their peripheries is a continuous process (Veltz, 1996).
The concentration processes taking place in the European met-
ropolitan regions result in significant spatial diferences due to the
uneven development of areas afected by concentration processes
and those excluded from them. According to the French Veltz, the
spatial structure of France, which was created on the basis of the
concentration of global economy in metropolitan regions, is
bipolar, which may be characterised by strong inequalities
between the Paris region and the other regions (mainly the
Southern district) (Veltz, 1996, 33.). Philipe Cadena states that
the 117 municipalities with over two milion inhabitants concen-
trate the most powerful institutions, the wealthiest families, and
even a part of country-specific poverty(Cadena, 2000, 139.).
Molenkopf and Castels used the term dual society for indicating
inequality problems (Molenkopf–Castels, 1991).The term used by
them is associated with the spatial and social inequalities which
developed as a consequence of globalization, with the advantages
of regions and spatial groups linked to global economy and the dis-
advantages of the excluded ones. The term ‘société duale’ or ‘dual
city’ expresses the economic and social contradictions between
groups living in large metropolises, urban regions which are linked
to global economy and old industrial cities, urban regions hit by
the crisis, large housing estates inhabited by the poor, smal cities
and declining, smal rural areas (Ascher, 1995, 126.).
However, the concept of dual society is debated by several
experts, because dynamic urban regions are also structured and
declining regions also have groups of high social status. For this
reason, for example, Ascher proposes using the structure of three-
part societies based on the place occupied in the Fordist wage
structure instead. In this distribution on the one hand, there are
people of stable socio-economic status in the public sector or at
private companies, on the other hand, there are people who are in
unstable position and who are excluded from the labour market.
Within the first large group a further diferentiation is possible in
terms of safety, and those being in precarious position would form
the third group. The three groups live three diferent ways of life by
leading diferent urban lifestyles (Ascher, 1995, 130.).
Inequalities are manifested not only between metropolises,
global city regions and other regions but also within the internal
structure of global cities and metropolises as spatial economic
inequalities between the core city and its urban neighbourhood.
Veltz for example describes the relationship between the core and
the peripheral area of the Paris region as a pyramid paterned
spatial hierarchy (Veltz, 1996, 33.).
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The development opportunities of urban networks created by
the globalizing world economy, and the development opportuni-
ties of cities and their urban regions (as wel as of the involved
national societies) are strongly differentiated. Between cores and
peripheries, and within certain localities social polarization, the
system of gradualy increasing spatial inequalities has strengthe -
ned; the economy and the upper classes are concentrated mainly
in city centres with favourable conditions, and in good suburbs,
while the poor, the disadvantaged, the lower social classes are
located in bad conditioned city centres and dilapidated urban
neighbourhoods.
Social tensions became apparent even in global cities or ‘show-
case cities’ as they were named by Boltanski and Chiapelo. The
development differences between the residences of the elite –
including the expert groups or the management of multinational
companies, or the homes of economic and political decision-
makers – and the neighbourhoods inhabited by the educated
middle-classes, and the marginalized, the disadvantaged, and the
unemployed have become obvious (Boltanski–Chiapelo, 1999).
Sassen’s analyses confirm the structural regional disparities in
inner metropolitan regions; the diferences between city centres
and peripheries, or urban neighbourhoods which beyond the dif-
ferent historical determination originate partly from the territorial
specificities of the location of global capital at companies, partly
from the social class orientation and resulting lifestyles of the resi -
dents living in the urban region. According to this, companies
being truly in global positions (and according to Sassen’s ‘Global
City’) the so-caled ‘new class’, i.e. high-income managers, highly
skiled occupational groups, employees with equity portion gene -
raly live in city centres, while the employees of routine national
companies, as wel as people belonging rather to the national middle
classes live in the peripheries of urban regions (Sasen, 1991).
Social wel-being issues in Eastern Europe
The oil crisis, the debt, the negative consequences of the finan-
cial crisis did not spare the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe either. The social problems resulting from the global eco-
nomic crises in the 1970s and 1980s, however, emerged in a spe-
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cific context, in the circumstances of the Central and Eastern
European socialist states. These systems could be characterized
by a centralized, one-party based power system and redistributive
mechanisms, i.e. a social administration system based on the
redistribution of financial resources. Their additional features
included the lack of local (corporate, regional) autonomy, exclu-
sive state ownership, neglected market conditions, the absence of
social participation, lack of civil society organizations and move-
ments, and last but not least, the presence of the party-state
manoeuvring between “soft” and “hard” dictatorship perching
on and intimidating the daily lives of individuals, and the comp -
lete absence of the freedom of speech.
The existing socialist systems concealed the different social
problems and inequalities for a long time. Unemployment was
held ‘behind the gates’, spatial and social polarization, residential
segregation were denied, it was believed the whole thing could be
solved by building new housing estates, with equaly smal apart-
ments. Paying homogeneous wages also served for hiding social
inequalities, as wel, as the (declared and presumed) homoge-
neous development of new industrial cities, the unilateral com-
munist ideologies communicated by the press, and the media.
However, the second half of the 1980s brought some changes,
as it was impossible to continue to conceal the worsening eco-
nomic and financial problems of the Central and Eastern
European countries, the systems maintained and supported by
foreign loans had become unsustainable, the predictable colapse
of the Soviet bloc was appreciable as wel as the shaping of a new
world power system.
Due to the economic and social problems, entangled into each
other, several countries faced not only social conflicts, but also
freedom fights and riots. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the
1968 Prague Spring, the workers’ strikes in 1956 in Poznań, in
1970 in Gdańsk, as wel as in 1976 in Radom and in Ursus, broke
out due to the difficulties of everyday life (especialy the continu-
ous increase of prices) people formulated the needs for the dis-
placement of power, the goals of civil rights, alternative publicity,
the freedom of association, the recreation of traditional commu-
nities and social networks. 
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring, the
efects of the new French, German, American leftist movements in
28 Viktória Szirmai
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the 1960s on Eastern Europe, including Hungary (Heler, 1968)
and the 1968 Hungarian economic reform movement15caled the
new Economic Mechanism resulted in new phenomena in
Hungary: the introduction of the so-caled Hungarian model, the
evolution of a kind of ‘soft’ dictatorship and greater freedom to
the press. Thanks to the economic reforms, the Hungarian model
exhibited some special features such as the slow organization of
market elements, the development of the so-caled second econo-
my16, the limited but yet independent operation of larger compa-
nies and cities (mainly county towns). Last but not least, it result-
ed in the slow rise of the bourgeois class, which means not only the
emergence of social diferentiation, but rather its manifestation,
the publication of scientific works on the whole phenomenon. In
this, in addition to social scientists, some representatives of the
press and the opposition groups played an important role.
The difficulties became more serious in the 1980s due to the
fact that the signs of economic decline became perceptible even
in Hungary. Between 1956 and 1980, according to the Central
Statistical Office data, the growth of GDP significantly declined,
which was due to the phenomena of economic downturn. As a
result of the oil crisis between 1976 and 1983 the price of the
Soviet oil sold in the CMEA markets more than quadrupled.
The country’s western currency debt continued to rise, real earn-
ings have falen, and although social unrest intensified, social
movements had not yet started. The Hungarian model, the ‘soft’
socialist dictatorship, the consumption opportunities which were
very limited in comparison to what was expected, but which were
stil beter compared to the other socialist countries, as wel as the
operation of the second economy prevented large mass demonstra-
tions for a time. However, the end of the 1980s brought a change.
15The new economic mechanism was a comprehensive reform of economic
management and planning, which was introduced in Hungary in 1968. With
the reform, the role of central planning decreased and corporate autonomy
increased in production and investment, and prices were liberalized, i.e.
beyond the officialy fixed prices, the prices of some products could freely fol-
low market demand and finaly the centraly determined wage system was
replaced by a more flexible, company regulated system within certain limits. 
16The second economy was introduced in the 1980s. This includes legal, for-
profit activities, carried out in private sphere areas for the purpose of supple-
menting income: for example, backyard and subsidiary farming, private hous-
ing, and smal-scale industrial activities.
Several groups of the Hungarian society, especialy the elite social
strata, but also the smal and middle classes wanting to consume
(hopping out to shop at the neighbouring Austria ) were not sat-
isfied with the quantity and the quality of life opportunities
ofered by the ‘soft’ dictatorship. Therefore, at the end of the
1980s, more and more social conflicts broke out leading towards
the change of regime. They were based on the cooperation of for-
mulating civil society forces, including employees’ groups and
political opposition groups (Szirmai, 1999; Albert, 2001).
However, the content and social basis of conflicts largely dif-
fered from each other. The social movements, the political unrest
mobilized by the opposition’s political forces, the goals to change
the political power structure, the employees’ actions were less
aimed at changing the political system than were motivated by
people’s fears of losing their jobs, and by the need to protect job
opportunities even if they provide low income, but ensure securi-
ty for the people. This demand (for example, in case of the erupt-
ed social and environmental conflicts in the new Hungarian
industrial cities), although for a short-term only, ensured the sur-
vival of the socialist system, and also temporarily relieved the ge -
neral crisis of the regime (Szirmai, 1999).
The social and political changes of the 1990s quieted political
(including environmental issues motivated) conflicts, for a long
time, it seemed, the new civilian political system would give way
to the enforcement of a wide range of social interests, among
others on the basis of integrating civil society actors into the
political system. During the institutionalization process the for-
mer social movements transformed into political parties; in the
past they never had any chance for such type of organizational
change, while some social movements kept their movement pro-
file even after the change of regime, but with limited functions
and political space (Szabó, 1993).
During the processes of the 1990s, the interests of the elite were
largely satisfied and several of the leading personalities were
elected into local and central power systems, their living condi-
tions significantly improved. The modern civil society and eco-
nomic conditions and the developing market economy created
the possibilities for the highly awaited consumption. However,
the civil society got into peripheral position. It was partly due to
the fact that the powers of social movements, which seemed to
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have strengthened previously, became weaker due to the fact that
party building proved to be a much more powerful process than
movement organization. And this was not favourable for the
organization of social conflicts, which gradualy calmed down.
The 2000s, the emerging contradictions of new global interests
again led to a different situation. The threats of the 2000s,
including the mortgage crisis from 2007 to 2008 and the global
economic and financial crisis after 2008 originated in the United
States. Today we already know that in the years 2000-2001 in
America, due to the huge fal of property prices, people started to
buy houses and flats. People were able to take out large amount
of loans from the state, which they had to repay only in 30-40
years time (in those years, unprecedented in American history,
65% of the people had owned their houses or flats, of which only
a smal part had been paid). The mortgage crisis starting in the
financial markets had brought economic downturn in the US,
Japan and Europe. The crisis hiting investment banking, the run-
away exchange prices, foreign currency loans, had their impacts
on people’s everyday life, several individuals lost their homes, and
they were also threatened by losing their jobs. This, again, gave
rise to social mobilization processes.
Poverty, rising unemployment led to protest strikes, and often
inflicted a series of brutal street conflicts in countries such as
Italy, France, and Spain. Although the Hungarian society’s con-
flict culture is differentiated, it differs from the tensions generat-
ed by the civilian forces of Western societies, and other mobiliza-
tion factors, and differs from the Western type of stronger con-
flict readiness which is capable of articulating community inte -
rests as wel. The social unrest among the Hungarian population
started to increase vigorously, namely because the global finan-
cial and credit crisis did not spare the country either.
In the years prior to 2008, the year of global economic crisis,
Hungarian banks and financial institutions also had taken a
series of measures that enabled the population to get home mort-
gage loans relatively quickly and easily. 2003 was an outstanding
year in terms of housing loans, when the amount of home mort-
gage loans one and a half-fold increased in comparison with the
previous year; from 992 bilion HUF to 1,437 bilion HUF17. This
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171 Euro=302,93 HUF (Hungarian Forint) (2015.02.26.)
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is explained by the fact that the state provided considerable inte -
rest subsidy in that year. However, it is clearly seen that as an out-
come of the global economic crisis, the amount of housing loan
subsidies fel back to more than one third. According to the
Central Statistical Office’s estimates, in 2011, approximately 1
milion 900 thousand people – that is, every fifth Hungarian per-
son – were affected by the problem of mortgage loans (CSO,
201118).The social discontent was increased by the totaling
effects created by the transition process the historical contradic-
tions and global processes. The gaps deepened between different
social groups, different regions, urban regions and their internal
spatial units as wel, social polarization intensified and social
inequalities became even more significant.
The interests of the elite have also changed. While in the past it
was not in their interest, only to put only those minor problems
on the conflict territory that they had the ability to deal with and
did not mean any risks for the safe operation of their political
power structure, in recent years a growing number of political
actions initiated by national and local elites or even opposition
groups have emerged in the political ‘arena’. These groups have
already been interested in making certain kinds of tensions man-
ifest. At the end of 2014 several civil society movements showed
up in the streets of big cities and Budapest.
Social and spatial inequalities in Eastern Europe
A comparison of the income data between European countries
(including Western and Eastern Europe, and Hungary) clearly
shows the Eastern European countries (though internaly diferen-
tiated) disadvantaged positions, partly as compared to Western
European countries, and partly as compared to the EU average.
The differences originate mainly from the historical and eco-
nomic disparities (including GDP differences) between the wes t-
ern and the eastern, so-caled post-communist countries, from
urban characteristics, from specific divisions, the characteristic
features of the adaptation to globalization process, from pro-
ductivity and employment factors, from belonging to the
18In 2014 25% of households living in metropolitan regions had loan debts.
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European Union, and the dates of EU accession  (and also the
expectations related to it), and last but not least, from the mal-
functions of the European cohesion policy. Although the EU has
made a number of important strategic decisions that aimed at
the mitigation of regional inequalities but in the majority of cases
they proved to be unsuccessful19(Horváth, 2004; 2015).
The political and economic changes starting in the early 1990s
in Central and Eastern European countries, the development of
market economy, the EU accession and its support systems cre-
ated opportunities for economic and income convergence. The
real processes had not only brought partial results, but also the
recognition that convergence creates very big differences, for
example in the case of the ‘Visegrád Countries’. This is supported
by the latest research, stating that Poland and Slovakia have
much more successfuly realized their income convergence, than
Hungary. Among other things, it shows that household incomes
between 2005 and 2013 increased the fastest in Slovakia and the
least in Hungary(Szivós, 2014, 58.).
Recent social scientific researches show that over the last 10
years sharp structural changes can be observed in Hungary mani -
festing in the growing impoverishment of the middle class, in the
lagging of lower classes and in the deepening of social gaps.
According to Eurostat data for 2011, 31% of Hungary’s popula-
tion is exposed to the risk of poverty and social exclusion
(Hegedüs–Horváth, 2012, 16.).
Domestic researches verify the visibly strengthened impoverish-
ment in the lower segments of the income distribution system.
Today, about one and a half times as many people live on
incomes of less than eight years ago. The separation between
households and employment has increased in households; the
proportion of persons living in households where the head of the
household is employed and there are other public employees
increased, but the proportion of people who live in a household
where there are absolutely no active employees increased as wel. 
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19The European Commission’s various cohesion reports (such as the ones of
1996, 2004) claim several times that the disparities between regions despite
structural policy measures have remained essentialy unchanged. Horváth,
2004/9. 963.) (htp://www.matud.if.hu/04sze/05.html).
Taking a glance at the composition of income, we find that the
households of employees the rate of labour incomes increased,
while in the households of the non-employed the share of social
incomes increased (Tárki Háztartás Monitor [Household Monitor],
2012, 6.).
As the data of Társadalmi Riport 2014 (Social Report, 2014) indi-
cate the rate of people exposed to the risks of poverty and social
exclusion in Hungary is not only the highest of al the ‘Visegrád
Countries’, but has been steadily rising since 2008, while the Poles,
the Slovaks and the Czechs could reduce the risk ratio of people
exposed to such risks between 2005 and 2013 (Szivós, 2014, 61–62.). 
Poverty data obviously do not express the results of research in
the social structure, since they refer only to one of its factors. The
social inequality system is the consequence of not only one but of
several explanatory factors which compose a specific system of
relationships such as the level of education, occupational pres-
tige, job sharing, advocacy, power relations, income, wealth, con-
sumption, cultural, territorial and housing conditions. However,
the unequal distribution of cultural capital plays the most impor-
tant role in it (Kolosi, 2010).
According to a more recent study the social structural situation
of individuals is primarily determined by the possession of capi-
tals; cultural and social capital. By a person’s economic capital
we mean the existence or the absence of the individual’s income,
assets, savings and properties. By cultural capital we mean con-
sumption of high culture (theatre, museum, classical music,
books) and new culture (e.g. Internet, visiting social networking
sites, involvement in recreational sports). By social capital we
mean the number and quality of social contacts(GfK–MTA TK
Osztálylétszám, 2014).
The most recent social structure researches indicate that the
most significant determining factors of the social position a per-
son occupies in stratification are, in addition to age, the place of
residence and educational atainment(Tárki Háztartás Monitor
[Household Monitor], 2012; GfK –MTA TK Osztálylétszám, 2014).
A polarization process is taking place in the contemporary
Hungarian society in several aspects. This is reflected in the
country’s territorial divisions which are manifested by the gaps
which can be observed namely between the capital city and metro-
politan areas, between smal towns and rural residences.
34 Viktória Szirmai
35Social Well-being Issues in Europe…
According to this, members of the upper classes, including the
highly educated, typicaly live in metropolitan or urban residen-
tial areas. The lower classes of the society are concentrated in
smal town and rural residential areas (Kolosi, 1987; GfK–MTA TK
Osztálylét-szám, 2014). 
This polarization process is manifested also by the significantly
diminishing number and ratio of the people belonging to higher
social classes, and at the same time the colapse of the middle
class has strongly accelerated, while the ratio of poor classes has
increased (GfK–MTA TK Osztálylétszám, 2014).For these reasons,
until today a broad middle class stratum, which would be vital for
modernization, has stil not been formed. This verifies the dis-
torted structure of the Hungarian society (Kolosi–Tóth, 2014, 14.).
The ongoing social processes in Central and Eastern Europe fol-
low major Western European trends. The degree of urbanisation
is high (64-76%), since economic activity, global capital, and
urban population are al concentrated in metropolitan regions
(Ilés, 2002).However, urbanization slowed down in the 1990s,
which was a significant difference compared to Western Europe
as the ratio of urban population has been slowly increasing since
the 1990s, whereas it was stil decreasing in Central and Eastern
Europe. This trend changed noticeably in the last few years with
the decline of population halting in some cities and is some cities
this process has even reversed. Suburbanization processes gained
momentum during the transition thanks to a strengthening hous-
ing and real estate market, the establishment of market economy,
and last but not least to a slow but steady growth of the middle
class, leading to an increasing demand for new homes (including
detached houses). In the first half of the 1990s, the inner polari -
zation of cities was reflected in the simultaneous trends of the
‘citification’ of downtown areas and the forming of slums
(Lichtenberger–Cséfalvay–Paal, 1995). The trends of gentrification
and marginalisation were emerging in cities but more recently
they have appeared in urban regions as wel. One reason for the
later process is the increasing rate of social exclusion caused by
city centre rehabilitation projects (Enyedi–Kovács, 2006).People in
higher social classes, including those who are highly educated
with high income tend to live in big cities while those in the lower
classes are typicaly concentrated in smal-towns and rural resi-
dential areas.
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Europe’s competitiveness
Europe’s above-mentioned social and economic tensions (most
of which are also global), such as poverty, unemployment, income
and wealth inequalities, social conflicts are very much criticised in
the European Union. Anti-EU sentiments are on the rise among
several social groups in numerous countries. This is demonstrated
by the strengthening of extreme right- and left-wing political par-
ties that oppose multiculturalism, the free movement of labour
and globalisation and seeking to exclude immigrants and guest
workers from poorer member states and continents. 
The main reasons for critical atitudes and sentiments towards
the European Union are anomalies perceived in EU member states,
the institutional systems of the EU and those of member states,
their rules and regulations, intervention policies and in the creation
and sharing of the EU’s financial resources. Many countries believe
that they pay in too much and get litle back, while others feel that
the amount of subsidies granted to them is insuficient.
The fundamental reasons behind these anomalies are Europe’s
social and regional inequalities (that also exist on a global level),
and the internal difficulties of different societies. Contemporary
modern capitalism is incapable of providing remedy to social ten-
sions, which results in disparities constantly reproducing them-
selves. As a result, left-wing, Marxist and neo-Marxist egalitarian
ideologies are disappearing, in part due to the failure of the so-
caled “existing” socialist regimes that are now defunct.
Meanwhile, it should also be recognized that there are profes-
sional groups, such as sociologists, geographers, and lately also
economists, who from time to time express a desire to create
societies that may not be completely egalitarian but would be
more equal than the ones that exist today, while also mitigating
inequalities and contradictions in existing ones. Efforts toward
this can be seen within the European Union as wel. While it is not
our goal to summarise or even briefly list those EU documents
that aim to ameliorate social problems and address regional
inequalities by creating new models for competitiveness (for
instance, cohesion reports, the Cologne Summit of 1999, the Lisbon
Summit of 2000 or the Gothenburg Summit of 2001),we must stil
point out that these documents and the fundamental competi-
tiveness concepts have shown significant changes by including
37Social Well-being Issues in Europe…
more and more social factors alongside the mainly economy-ori-
ented criteria of competitiveness.
In order to solve Europe’s economic and social problems not
only new EU documents but also various new theoretical concepts
were created. We must mention two such comprehensive works
that convey important ideas relevant to this book, the second of
which has played a fundamental role in the empirical research
underpinning this study. The first one offers theoretical scientific
answers to the crises of the 1980s and the second one to those of
the 2000s, respectively. 
The Brundtland Report, prepared by the United Nations of the
World Commission on Environment and Development, is aimed
to tackle the social and economic problems of the 1980s(Our
Common Future, 1987).
The Report, writen by an independent commission of scientists
appointed by the Secretary General of the UN, was aimed at
developing criteria for worldwide environment-friendly sustain-
able development up to the year 2000. According to the
Brundtland Report, one of the main causes of that era’s crises
was that ‘many social objectives fel by the wayside’ (Our Common
Future, 1988, 17.). The chalenges the world is facing such as the
social and economic crisis signs mostly stemming from the envi-
ronment, demographic problems, poverty, food security, energy
and climate concerns, and ecological stresses need remedy. This
requires a new concept, the theory of sustainable development.
The Report urges for ‘a new era of economic growth – growth
that is forceful and at the same time socialy and environmental-
ly sustainable’ (Our Common Future, 1988, 18.).
Therefore, the concept cals for a new kind of economic growth
programme: accelerating economic growth in a way which pro-
vides harmonious development and which preserves and extends
natural resources – whose final goal is prosperity.
The appearance of this concept led to numerous debates and
questions, concerning mainly the definition and applicability of
sustainability. There were debates on what social sustainability
should give weight to: only social problems, other economic and
environmental problems or the complexity of these phenomena.
The question what should be sustained also raised several dis-
putes: the state of the natural environment or the level of social
development (Enyedi, 1994).
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Although the debates have not calmed down yet, the theory of
sustainable development has made a lasting impact on the poli-
cy practices of both the EU and various European governments.
The concept led to the development of tools for practical solu-
tions, political programmes, support systems and tenders were
elaborated. In addition to the countless studies examining the
questions of sustainability, there have also been manuals and
summaries published on ‘best practices’ to assist affected social
actors and local governments. 
Facts show however, that due to systemic political barriers and
conflicting social interests, al these have not decisively mitigated
economic, social and environmental problems yet. Several stu dies
show that significantly fewer social powers are interested in sus-
tainable development than in ‘unsustainable’ one. Profit-orien -
ted development which destroys the environment, raises social
problems and serves for the interests of a minority of European
societies only. The balance of power that would favour change is
also missing, as is the cooperation of professional groups that
should theoreticaly be interested in ensuring the equal preva-
lence of economic, environmental and social factors. 
Even European civil society forces have failed to substantialy
transform social practices and development policy decisions and
to help turn theory into practice, thereby enabling European soci-
eties – although the way and degree of the marginalisation of
social groups are necessarily different in the various countries and
political systems – for social participation and integration.
Due to conceptual problems, neither the Brundtland Report, nor
its supporters (who were numerous, as indicated by Susan Murcort
who found some 57 definitions of sustainability [see Fleischer,
2002]) could truly interconnect economic, environmental, and
especialy social criteria systems. And although they emphasised
the importance of al the three systems, they gave priority to busi-
ness (and environmental) aspects and concerns, and social aspects
were only deemed important in the context of these two. 
Perhaps this is why many researchers insist that social crises
need to be solved by the one-sided stimulation of economic
development, that is, by strengthening economic competitive-
ness. There are also European scientists who advise on reducing
the stil existing European model of redistribution and state
involvement in social maters and strengthening an American,
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market-based model since the state lacks the resources necessary
to support social aspects (Alesina–Giavazzi, 2008).
Europe’s future stil remained in question after the publication
of the Brundtland Report as economic, social and environmental
problems have been steadily escalating. Today, it has become
increasingly obvious to European national governments, and to
the scientific community that both global and European econo m -
ic crises are self-reproducing in nature, leading to new, adverse
social consequences and threats of social conflicts. New solutions
that transcend old paradigms are needed to address increasing
structural inequalities, social polarisation, social and economic
diferences between various regional levels, the increasing number
of social groups that are excluded from global advantages (inclu -
ding advantages related to EU accession), the inequalities among
metropolitan regions, between urban and rural areas, between
core and peripheral regions, and the dichotomies among peri ph -
eries. We believe that the Stiglitz Report is an outstanding concept
that provides these solutions, as its theoretical model obviously
transcends not only the Brundtland Report but a series of other
analyses and policy concepts. It is because (in order to achieve sus-
tainable development) it does not concentrate on economic
growth and its social and environmental sustainability aspects.
Instead, its central concept is social wel-being and (sustainable)
social development which rests on the three equal pilars of eco -
nomy, environment and society. 
The importance of a social development model based on the
Stiglitz Report is huge since it also provides answers to contempo-
rary worldwide economic and social problems. It ofers the possi-
bility of social integration and development while stimulating the
economy – emphasising the wel-being of the countries, regions
and societies in question instead of production. This approach –
with an adequate social and political support – could reform the
social practices of European countries (including their urban deve -
lopment) and would create a new, socialy oriented competitive-
ness model which could integrate social interests. Theoreticaly,
this model can build on earlier welfare state traditions, integrate
afected social groups, and, through widespread participation
processes, stimulate the economy and al social actors.
